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October 1972
Revised May 1973

THEATER FORCE POSTURE ANALYSIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By: RICHARD B. FOSTER STEPHEN P. GIBERT
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Prepared for:

OFFICE, CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

Under direction of:

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CONTRACT DAHC19-71-C-0001



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ABSTRACT

This Theater Force Posture Analysis Executive Summary, the Summary (Volume I) and the supporting appendices (Volume II) apply primarily to the Central Region of the Allied Command Europe. U.S. objectives and U.S. policy for Europe in the changing international environment of the 1970s are examined as are the foreign policy and national objectives of the Soviet Union. European views of NATO defense problems are then presented with particular emphasis on the linkage between U.S. strategic and NATO forces. The implications of future negotiations (CSCE, MBFR, etc.) on the theater forces are discussed with the pitfalls and problem areas highlighted. Guidelines are then delineated for NATO Theater Forces for 1972-1982 and a NATO force posture and force characteristics are proposed. Volume I and the appendices in Volume I and Volume II provide detailed support for the summary material presented in this Executive Summary.

Disclaimer

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by authorized documents.

Contractual Task

This report is submitted in partial fulfillment of the research under Task Order 72-3 of Contract DAHC19-71-C-0001.

FOREWORD

This Theater Force Posture Analysis for the 1970s and 1980s was conducted for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, United States Army, as one of the three major areas of investigation: Task 1, Integrated Forces Posture Analysis; Task 2, Strategic Forces Posture Analysis; and Task 3, Theater Force Posture Analysis. A number of earlier studies have also contributed to the strategic study program re NATO.

The contractual scope for the Theater Force Posture Analysis is as follows:

Synthesize and evaluate alternative theater force concepts and postures that meet U.S. sufficiency requirements dictated by U.S. commitments and security postures, as indicated in Presidential statements. While the emphasis shall be on the NATO theater, other theaters shall be examined as appropriate. Force concepts shall be within the parameters and constraints established by preferred strategies of the European NATO allies, and by allies in other theaters, when relevant. Forces shall be evaluated under alternative weapons employment concepts expressed in NATO, U.S. Government, and other appropriate policy papers. Interrelationships and coupling between strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces and tactical nuclear forces shall be analyzed for their effect in meeting theater force requirements. Force elements shall be evaluated for their effects on deterrence, war termination, and escalation control. The study shall analyze current and projected allied nuclear capabilities, allied plans for the use of their nuclear forces, and the relationship of these forces to U.S. theater forces, including conventional forces. Preferred directions of development of nuclear weapons, supporting systems, and organization structure shall be indicated.

The research findings for this Executive Summary are reported in detail in a Summary Report (Volume I) which also contains two appendices. Volume II contains a series of supporting appendices. In addition, there are several separate supporting input studies.

This Executive Summary has been prepared as part of the research program of the Strategic Studies Center (SSC) for the Army and other clients. Richard B. Foster, Director of the SSC, was the Project Manager,

and Hamilton A. Twitchell was Project Leader. GEN Charles H. Bonesteel, III (USA Ret.), GEN Barton E. Spivy (USA Ret.), and LTG John J. Davis (USA Ret.) provided continuing review and critiques of great value to the study. This Executive Summary is based on the material contained in Volumes I and II. The major contributors to these volumes were:

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I INTRODUCTION

The rapidly changing environment on both the national and international scene has profoundly affected U.S. foreign policy and its supporting military policy. Even greater changes are foreshadowed in the decade ahead. With a view to assuring that this analysis of the role of theater forces over the coming decade is carried out within a properly conceived and realistic context, the more critical and long-term political, economic, and military trends are examined at the outset and their implications assessed. Having established the overall perspective, the report then analyzes the different force concepts and postures and develops proposed guidelines for the forces.

This report focuses on the European theater, and particularly on the most critical area within that theater, the Central Region. This appears to be the area with the greatest need for the definition of a viable relationship between the strategic nuclear forces, the theater and tactical nuclear forces and the conventional components of the forces.

The pattern of political-military relations between the United States and its Western allies is entering a new phase of "partnership." The problems and challenges the Atlantic Alliance faces are drastically different from those in the 1950s or even those in the 1960s.

The forthcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), negotiations in SALT II and MBFR all require urgent attention to U.S. and allied policies and military doctrine concerning force relationships. This study examines, therefore, the relationship of forces in its broadest sense.

II U.S. OBJECTIVES AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1970s: THE NIXON DOCTRINE

Recognizing that the changing international environment called for a new American foreign policy, President Nixon has set forth a new approach to the challenge of the 1970s. The Nixon Doctrine has a positive aim--that of a generation of peace in a multipolar world. The three elements of the Nixon Doctrine--U.S. strength, U.S. allies as partners, and U.S.-Soviet negotiations--are to be orchestrated in a dynamic diplomacy in concert with our principal allies. The indirect use of military force--the political values and strategic utilities in an atmosphere of détente and peaceful coexistence and competition--is stressed rather than the simpler force-to-force comparisons which measure only the direct use of military force.

A. The Changing International System

The international system as it has existed since World War II is presently experiencing rapid change. The two most important changes are: (1) the attainment by the Soviet Union of strategic parity with the United States; and (2) the emergence of a politically and economically multipolar world.

With the approach of a rough state of strategic parity between the United States and the USSR, the Nixon Administration recognized that it was necessary to reappraise its strategic policy and seek to improve its security through negotiations with the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, such negotiations tended to heighten still further the fears of allies concerning U.S. guarantees, thus making it even more necessary to reformulate strategic doctrine. Within this framework, the nuclear force posture was based on the concept of "strategic sufficiency." This called for "maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from

being coerced" and for "enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking."¹

The emergence of political and economic multipolarity has resulted from the fact that the two superpowers have been joined by three new politico-economic constellations of power: Japan, the Peoples Republic of China, and Western Europe. Multiple relationships among these five centers appear certain to dominate international politics for the foreseeable future. Since these relationships are asymmetrical, international politics and the global balance of power will become more complex. In terms of strategic nuclear capability, the world remains bipolar and a tripolar economic relationship has developed between Japan, the United States, and Western Europe.

B. Shifts in Diplomatic Focus

The Administration has recognized that the achievement of strategic parity by the USSR has joined the two superpowers in a limited adversary relationship different from that which interfaces with any other actors in the international system. Under these conditions there is a range of behavior from conflictual to cooperative. Each superpower shares a situation of near-total vulnerability; each is comparatively invulnerable to lesser states, and each is capable of the utter destruction of any other nation.

As the Nixon Administration recognized the growth of new centers of political and economic power and, potentially, of military power as well, American policy has gradually shifted toward according a higher priority to problems involving the pentagonal powers. There is a more restrained and selective policy toward Third World countries, while European concerns are being given more attention than in the immediate past.

¹ Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Toward a Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Defense Report on President Nixon's "Strategy for Peace," The FY 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, p. 109 (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 9 March 1971).

C. U.S. Policy for Europe in the 1970s

The Nixon Doctrine reaffirms U.S. support (1) for a strengthened and more unified Europe and calls for a Europe which assumes "a more balanced association and more genuine partnership" with America; (2) for measures which will further the coalescence of Western Europe into a stronger and more cohesive grouping with an identity of its own; (3) for the original aims of NATO which remain valid in the 1970s as Europe and America continue to have many common and complementary interests in foreign policy and defense matters; and (4) for the continuing need to insure that NATO strategy remains credible in the light of the overall strategic balance and the threat.

In the conduct of détente negotiations, it will be essential for Western Europe and the United States to insure that they have common goals and mutually acceptable supporting policies. Until such time as there is an actual easing of tensions as a result of successful negotiations, it will be particularly important for the NATO forces in Europe to maintain an effective deterrent posture.

D. Military Policy and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence

The four realities of today's deterrence are strategy, politics, money, and manpower:¹ (1) Strategic reality is concerned with the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the United States and its allies. (2) The political reality is concerned with both international and internal political factors which affect national security policy. (3) The fiscal reality concerns the urgent need to commit greater resources to domestic problems at a time of rising military costs. (4) The manpower reality is concerned with the pressures to have smaller active armed forces and to proceed toward all-volunteer services.²

¹ Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, The Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1973, pp. 29-34 (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 15 February 1972).

² Ibid., pp. 35, 156.

Defense planning criteria under the Nixon Doctrine is implemented according to four guidelines. In deterring:

- Strategic nuclear war, primary reliance will be placed on U.S. strategic forces.
- Theater nuclear war, the United States also has primary responsibility, but those allies who have nuclear capabilities share in this responsibility.
- Theater conventional war, U.S. and allied forces share responsibility.
- Subtheater or localized war, the country which is threatened has primary responsibility, particularly for providing manpower, but when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake the United States will provide help as appropriate.¹

A fundamental precept of the Nixon Doctrine is that the United States expects other non-communist nations to undertake a greater role in their own defense. This "Total Force" planning is intended to facilitate the assumption of increased defense burdens by allied countries. This approach also involves both a more equitable division of responsibilities between the United States and allied countries and a more efficient integration of U.S. and allied resources in order to achieve greater security at lower cost.²

E. Constraints on Nixon Doctrine Policies³

In the domestic arena, the fundamental assumptions about the scope and size of the military establishments are being challenged in many quarters. Opposition to the draft and the uncertainty of whether sufficient enlistments will be obtained when the change is made to all-volunteer forces also impinge upon the capabilities of the armed forces. Costs

¹ Ibid., p. 23.

² Ibid., pp. 63-64.

³ An expanded version of this point is contained in W. Joshua, et al., "Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the Defense Planning Process," SSC-TN-8974-61, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (14 April 1972).

for general purpose forces, despite manpower cutbacks, are likely to increase in the 1970s.

The Nixon Doctrine makes it clear that the United States will continue to maintain strategic forces sufficient to deter Soviet attack and to shield allies from nuclear threats. While this aspect of policy is generally accepted, Congressional actions are reducing the options open to the administration.

The Nixon Doctrine also must cope with opposition to its policies among its allies, particularly in the area of burden sharing. It is also not certain that, without U.S. aid, America's Asian allies will be able to maintain large security forces after all American ground troops are withdrawn from Vietnam and perhaps from Korea.

III SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Soviet capabilities to conduct an aggressive, worldwide foreign policy have never been as great as at present, but current Soviet policy appears to be one of consolidating present positions and moving away from high-risk situations in non-vital areas.

A. Policy Reversals and Agonizing Reappraisal

It would appear that the USSR may have become less optimistic about gains to be made in the Third World, but evidence of this is contradictory. This should not result in a retreat from the Third World, but the Soviets may pursue a more selective approach. The Middle East is likely to continue to be an area of great interest to the USSR outside of Europe.

The Soviet Union in order to maintain its hold on Eastern Europe has used force three times in the last twenty years. The enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine at Prague was a clear signal that the sovereignty of satellite nations was to be limited by the Soviet Union. Nationalist tendencies and independent attitudes were viewed as attempts by internal anti-socialist forces to pave the way for penetration by the West.¹ The nations of Eastern Europe now know that the Politburo was willing to use the Soviet military should deviationist tendencies go beyond certain limits.

Current Soviet policy toward Western Europe is characterized by a well-orchestrated political-military strategy designed to:

- Achieve acceptance by the West of the status quo in Europe encompassing the legitimization of the regimes of the East European states, specifically the GDR; the recognition of World War II frontiers and existing boundaries; and non-use-of-force agreements to guarantee these frontiers.
- Use détente to induce and encourage complacency in Western Europe, with a view toward the unilateral reduction in NATO forces.

¹ See The New York Times (4 October 1968). Also see Pravda (20 September 1968).

- Fractionate the NATO Alliance and isolate the FRG from the remainder of Western Europe.
- Erode U.S. influence in Europe, including the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces.
- Prevent effective political, military, and economic integration of Western Europe.
- Erode the will of individual nations to resist Soviet influence and exploit anti-American attitudes (e.g., Sweden).
- Fractionate individual nations and provoke internal divisiveness (e.g., Italy, Yugoslavia).
- "Finlandize" Western Europe in order ultimately to incorporate it into the Soviet sphere of influence.

B. Military Policy Under Conditions of Strategic Parity

The present military policy of the Soviet leaders appears to be based on the following principles: (1) the prevention of general nuclear war through the deterrent power of Soviet strategic nuclear forces; (2) the maintenance of a strong position in Europe, with forces superior to those of NATO; (3) maintenance of sufficient armed strength in Asia to cope at least with Chinese incursions on Soviet territory; and (4) expansion of conventional forces in general and naval forces in particular to enable the USSR to play a more active role in the Third World and to enjoy a global status comparable to that of the United States.

IV EUROPEAN VIEWS ON NATO DEFENSE

The views of the European allies on deterrence and defense are critical considerations in the selection and implementation of a meaningful strategy for NATO. If NATO's strategy and its supporting force posture are to be viable, they must be politically acceptable to the European members of the alliance as well as to the United States.

European perception of the Soviet threat emphasizes two basic aspects: (1) the possibility that a crisis might escalate into an armed conflict which might go nuclear, a possibility which the Czech crisis, in particular, brought to the foreground; (2) the efforts of the Soviet Union to exploit its military power in a campaign of political coercion against the individual European allies.

A. Flexible Response Strategy

In spite of their official embrace of flexible response, the European allies prefer a deterrent strategy and are not enthusiastic about a concept that places prime reliance on the conventional option beyond the initial stage of combat. Their emphasis on deterrence reflects: (1) their fear of another devastating conflict sweeping across Europe; and (2) their belief that in the final analysis the Soviet Union will be deterred from aggression only by the risk of damage against its homeland. Strategic nuclear parity has not changed the preference of the allies for deterrence. However, the present state of parity has forced them to consider the possibility of conflicts at different levels and the relationships between such different levels of conflict.

In looking at the requirements for defense, few Europeans feel that a conventional invasion can be contained by current conventional forces for more than a few days. Yet the European allies do not want to increase their own forces. They are afraid that this would allow the United States to withdraw some of its own troops, and they do not

feel that the European troops would provide the same degree of deterrent credibility in the eyes of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, the European allies do not want to fight a protracted conventional war.

B. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

European views regarding the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) are beginning to shift. When they first began to think about tactical nuclear weapons in the Fifties, the allies saw the role of TNW as (1) redressing the imbalance of conventional forces; (2) helping to defeat aggression if deterrence should fail; and (3) above all, as the explicit link to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The value of TNW lay, in the eyes of the Europeans, especially in their deterrent role and their trigger function.

Two factors have influenced European thinking: (1) the flexible response strategy of the Sixties conveyed to the Europeans the implication that if war were to break out, the United States would seek to contain such a conflict on the European continent; (2) the steadily improving Soviet military capability, conventional as well as nuclear, became increasingly alarming. As a result, the allies began to look in earnest at the implications flowing from the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The thinking of the principal U.S. allies in Europe on TNW may be summarized by listing their general preferences for TNW options:

- They advocate the early use of TNW.
- They do not want a use of TNW for purely demonstrative purposes without any military effect. In their view a so-called demonstrative option would be a sign of weakness and might encourage rather than discourage aggression.
- They do not want a massive across-the-board use of TNW, but insist on a highly selective use.
- They advocate a use which will minimize collateral damage even on targets in the Warsaw Pact, especially in East Germany. They also insist that the constraints of the host countries have to be considered.
- They do not want the use of TNW to be limited to NATO or West German territory alone; they want to have the flexibility which will permit them to hit targets wherever necessary.

- They want an in-theater capability which could strike deep into the Warsaw Pact countries and, if necessary, into the Soviet Union.

In light of these employment preferences, it is logical that the Europeans would not accept the so-called principle of "No First Use" of TNW against conventional aggression. To surrender the right of first use would inhibit NATO's flexibility and would bring back the spectre of political coercion in a Western Europe threatened by Soviet conventional forces. In short, the European allies have begun to consider more seriously than formerly the need for a defensive capability in order to strengthen deterrence. Within the constraint of the need to limit collateral damage, the tactical nuclear weapons are beginning to assume a critical war-fighting role. In addition, West European recognition of the implications of strategic parity has also spurred new interest in the role of French and British nuclear forces.

V CURRENT NATO DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGY

A. Current NATO Strategy

The present strategy was adopted in 1967 in recognition of the growing and more versatile Soviet threat. It places increased emphasis on the necessity for being prepared to meet a varying scale of attack throughout the NATO area. To this end, the concept continues to provide for deterrence and for forward defense. It also calls for the proper balance and linkage of the conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons.

This involves two principles: (1) to meet any aggression with direct defense at approximately the same level; and (2) to deter through the possibility of escalation. In order to remain credible, it is essential that an aggressor be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if need be, but he must be kept uncertain about the conditions of employment.

B. The AD-70 Report

In May of 1970 the NATO Council undertook a study, known as the AD-70 Report, of the major defense problems facing the alliance. Based on its review of this study, the NATO Council at its December meeting of that year reaffirmed the validity of the concept of "flexibility in response" and the need for an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The Council also noted certain imbalances between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities and recommended that certain conventional force improvements be carried out in the 1970s. Among the areas which the Council identified as needing priority attention are: armor/antiarmor potential, the air situation including aircraft protection, overall maritime capabilities, the peacetime deployment of ground forces, further improvements in allied mobilization and reinforcement capabilities and communications for crisis management purposes.¹

¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, p. 89 (NATO Information Service, Brussels, February 1972).

The timely completion of these conventional force improvements is contingent upon provision by the various countries of the additional resources needed to meet the quantitative improvements. This achievement would necessitate a reversal of the downward trend in defense expenditures of the past few years. The North Atlantic Council in commenting on this point in December of 1970 stated:

"The Alliance possesses the basic resources for adequate conventional strength. However, member countries are confronted with diverging trends in the pattern of expenditures and costs. On the [one] hand the cost of personnel and equipment continues to mount and most NATO countries are faced with major re-equipment programmes; on the other, in many member countries the share of GNP devoted to defence has declined and, even if outlays in money terms have risen, outlays in real terms have diminished owing to inflation. In marked contrast with the trend in Warsaw Pact countries' military expenditure,...[in real terms, there has been a continuous rise between 1965 and 1969 of about 5-6 percent per year in Soviet defense and defense-related expenditures¹] ... defence expenditures of the NATO European countries taken as a whole and calculated in real terms went down by 4% from 1964 to 1969."²

C. Varying Views on Flexible Response

Even though the allies have agreed in principle on the concept of "flexible response" and on the need for increased conventional strength, there are divergent views regarding these conventional forces. Some contend that NATO need have only a limited conventional capability to cope with small-scale attacks and others believe the conventional forces should have sufficient capability to deal effectively with the broad range of possible conventional attacks. Such a determination depends upon various factors: (1) the assessment of the threat--both as to capabilities and intent; (2) the contingencies the forces should be prepared to deal with; and (3) the forces required to meet such contingencies.

¹ Ibid., p. 88.

² Ibid., p. 89.

A special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in a recent report on "The American Commitment to NATO" made the following points, among others, regarding the threat in Central Europe.¹

"Dimension of the threat

The threat the Pact forces pose spans the spectrum of modern warfare--from the strategic to the tactical--from air warfare to the under-the-sea variety.

"Soviet forces make up approximately 45 percent of the total Warsaw Pact forces in peacetime and would make up 75 percent in wartime. It is important to note, however, that all Warsaw Pact forces have the advantage of standardization--in military doctrine, operational procedures and equipment--imposed by Soviet commanders and instructors.

"Nuclear forces

The Soviet strategic rocket forces and navy would support Warsaw Pact operations in Europe. At the nuclear strategic force level, the Soviets have available for targeting in Western Europe over 600 intercontinental, intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, as well as equally impressive numbers of medium bombers stationed in the western U.S.S.R. At the tactical nuclear level the Soviets have increased their delivery capability and number of weapons that would be available to support a conventional offensive.

"Central Europe

In the area of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary the Soviets have stationed about 15 tank divisions with an equivalent number of mechanized divisions. This present total of about 30 divisions represents a net increase in the last 10 years by a total of 5 divisions (those now stationed in Czechoslovakia). These ground forces are supported by 4 Soviet tactical air armies as well as an array of artillery and other combat-support units.

"In this central and perhaps most important area of Soviet interest (at least in terms of forces earmarked for operations in a specific area), the Eastern European countries of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary add about 25 high-readiness divisions and at least 10 more of reduced manning and equipment. After a relatively short period of time the Soviets with their Eastern

¹ U.S. House of Representatives, "The American Commitment to NATO," Report of the Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments of the Committee on Armed Services, 92d Congress, pp. 14952-3, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. (17 August 1972).

"European allies could amass in this area more than 80 divisions, with well over a million men, supported by more than 19,000 tanks and well over 2,000 tactical aircraft.

"To provide tactical nuclear support for this force in the central European area, there would be an augmentation of the present complement of tactical nuclear launchers to bring their total number up to well over 500. Artillery pieces in this central area would number about 10,000 (number includes launchers--multiple tube and heavy mortars). This concentration, generally opposite West Germany, has necessitated stationing in the Federal Republic of Germany the forces of 6 Allies (Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States) to bolster the West German Armed Forces."¹

In discussing relative balance of forces and the ability of NATO to implement the Flexible Response Strategy, the committee stated:

"The Warsaw Pact force is offensive-oriented: its size and posture go beyond any reasonable and conservative estimate based on Western military judgement of what would be required to defend Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R."²

And with regard to the ability to carry out the Flexible Response Strategy:

"It has to be conceded that we have no assurance that conventional forces will hold out indefinitely. It may be that after a period of time in a general attack the only way to stop advancing Warsaw Pact forces would be with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. NATO planning recognizes this and it is important that the leaders in the Kremlin recognize it."³

Senator Goldwater in discussing the need for SAM-D for the U.S. Army forces assessed the situation in Europe in less optimistic terms:

"...I want to bring one or two facts to the attention of the Senate. First, in war games in which I have participated from time to time, unless--and get this--unless the U.S. commander in Europe can retaliate immediately with nuclear-tipped weapons, our forces in Europe could not survive more than 3 days, possibly 2½ days."⁴

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 14955.

³ Ibid., p. 14958.

⁴ The U.S. Senate, "The Military Procurement Authorizations, 1973 (re SAM-D)," The Congressional Record, Volume 118, No. 119, p. S-12283, Washington, D.C. (31 July 1972).

Although there seems to be general agreement within the alliance on the quantitative aspects of the threat, estimates regarding Soviet intentions and the capabilities of the Pact forces are subject to different views depending on the weight attached to the various qualitative and quantitative considerations involved. Estimates of force capabilities and force requirements vary widely based on the different assumptions regarding such aspects as: the political and military objectives of the attack, the nature of the attack, warning and response times, mobilization capabilities and the advantages which surprise, initiative, and massing afford the aggressor. For example, conclusions derived from an assessment of an assumed conventional attack by Pact forces in roughly equal strength across the entire front of NATO's Central Region could be quite different from one in which it is assumed that the Pact forces would carry out an enveloping attack with the main effort being on the north flank and with a holding attack being conducted in the center (See Figure 1.)



Figure 1 EXAMPLE OF ENVELOPMENT ATTACK

VI GUIDELINES FOR NATO THEATER FORCES 1972-1982

The task now facing the alliance is essentially threefold: (1) to effect those improvements and changes that will give NATO's posture sufficient flexibility so that the alliance will have an adequate array of options to meet the formidable military challenge confronting it; (2) to restore mutual confidence in the strategy which is so essential to the will and cohesiveness of the alliance; and (3) to establish secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West.¹

As NATO pursues these aims, it will be important for the forces to meet certain objectives and design criteria. The more important of these are:

- The force posture should reflect the defensive nature of the alliance and to this end, the forces should be designed to:
 - Deter military conflict, or, if deterrence fails, to
 - Limit the conflict and terminate it within the framework of an agreed negotiating goal of preventing general nuclear war while providing for the security and survival of the NATO nations as independent states.
- Provide the required deterrent and defense capabilities through the coupling of the strategic and theater forces. Thus it is necessary to provide for the continuous relationship of forces --for deterrence, or if deterrence fails for terminating conflicts on acceptable terms before hostilities escalate to general war.
- The force posture and operational concepts should be politically acceptable to the Alliance.
- Employment concepts should provide for the timely, selective, and controlled use of tactical nuclear weapons against military targets and should minimize collateral damage as consistent with military objectives, accuracy, and required damage expectancy.
- With the view to maintaining coupling, U.S. strategic forces should continue to convey the ultimate threat of escalation to protect Western Europe against armed aggression and the threat thereof. This capability could be achieved by:

¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and Figures, p. 62 (NATO Information Services, Brussels, 1970).

- Providing strategic options for war termination other than assured destruction;
 - Enhancing extended deterrence through increased political credibility of strategic force coupling to theater forces;
 - Maintaining the compatibility of the U.S. strategic forces with those of allied nuclear powers;
 - Developing and implementing a new concept of the continuity of force relationships.
- The initial-use option for nuclear weapons should be retained. The Soviets possess major advantages on the central front; they have a preponderance of force and the advantages of initiative, geography and surprise.
 - NATO ground forces should be designed in such a manner that tactical nuclear and conventional weapons are complementary.
 - Control and release procedures for TNW use should be such as to meet political constraints and also to meet military requirements for selective and timely releases.
 - The basic posture of the force should be such that it is capable of being altered or adjusted to meet changing requirements stemming from security arrangements (SALT II, MBFR, etc.), the threat, and varying resource levels. Any restructuring of the force posture should be carried out in such a manner as to minimize reduction in the effectiveness of the force during the period of transition.

VII NATO FORCE POSTURE AND FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

There is a wide range of concepts which can be considered for determining the general characteristics of the forces required to carry out the basic task of deterrence and defense. As discussed previously, many Europeans favor a strategy which depends primarily on the strategic deterrent and care little for a concept which calls for a sustained conventional war-fighting capability. There are also some who endorse an essentially conventional-emphasis concept and others who favor the tripwire concept.

Both of these concepts--the conventional-emphasis and the tripwire--were adopted by NATO at one time in the past and subsequently discarded because they were politically infeasible. The conventional-emphasis concept was discarded because of technological advances and because the established Lisbon Force Goals were considered unrealistically high. The MC 14/2 concept calling for the "use of nuclear weapons at the outset in response to any aggression that was not of minor character" was adopted in 1957 and in turn was discarded ten years later in recognition of the need for a new and more flexible strategic concept.

Under today's conditions, neither the all-out conventional nor the tripwire concept is viable. For the reasons set forth above it is considered that there is a continuing need for the "balanced forces"¹ concept of flexible response with nuclear options--tactical nuclear, theater nuclear, strategic nuclear--complementing the conventional options but with no fixed pattern of employment.

A. Force Relationships and NATO's Force Posture

If NATO's collective defense posture is to provide the required deterrent and defense capabilities, the overall force posture should be as indicated below:

¹ NATO Facts and Figures, op. cit., p. 66.

- U.S. strategic forces should:
 - Be capable of deterring strategic attack and preventing nuclear coercion against the United States and allies.
 - Continue to convey the ultimate threat of escalation to protect Western Europe against armed aggression and the threat of armed aggression by providing strategic force options short of general war for war/crisis termination.
- The theater nuclear forces (including the British and French forces) should:
 - Provide an essential link in the deterrent chain between the U.S. strategic forces and tactical nuclear forces;
 - Provide a credible deterrent in Western Europe against the Soviet theater nuclear forces;
 - Serve as a significant independent deterrent (British and French only), and be compatible with other NATO nuclear forces.
- Tactical nuclear forces should:
 - Provide an indispensable link in the deterrent chain between theater nuclear and conventional forces;
 - Help redress the imbalance between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe;
 - By their presence and threatened first-use, force the enemy to disperse and adopt a nuclear-scared battlefield configuration, thereby denying him the advantages of mass and concentration of his conventional forces;
 - Provide a series of military options in order to increase the uncertainty of outcomes of a nuclear response, and to increase the ambiguity as to NATO response to aggression;
 - Provide war termination thresholds.
- Conventional forces should:
 - Provide a link in the chain of deterrence;
 - Increase the political credibility of the coupling of the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe by the presence of U.S. personnel;
 - Force the Soviets to mass their forces in preparation for attack so that their intentions can be discerned in advance and so that the Soviets will recognize that any large attack will exact a significant price and will subject their massed formations to a tactical nuclear attack;
 - Provide effective resistance to conventional attacks by Pact forces deployed in nuclear-scared formations;

- Provide a counter to minor aggressions and incursions.

These conventional forces should consist of:

- Active and ready reserve forces which possess a high degree of firepower (including dual-capable forces) and tactical mobility;
- A well-trained militia comprised of various elements, i.e., combat and logistical units, paramilitary, and unconventional forces. These ubiquitous forces should be lightly but effectively armed and equipped, utilizing requisitioned civilian transport, communications, POL and equipment to the extent available.

B. Force Posture Characteristics

The foregoing force posture calls for significant but evolutionary changes in doctrinal, organizational and materiel concepts which are more far-reaching than those called for in the AD-70 report. If the nuclear and conventional forces are to have the desired characteristics and capabilities, maximum advantage should be taken of the many important technological developments which are expected over the next decade and which show promise of enhancing NATO defensive capability.

1. Strategic Nuclear Forces

Although strategic nuclear forces have deterrence of nuclear war as their primary purpose, there may be other uses for limited numbers of them in deterrent or war-termination situations short of all-out war. These situations might arise in a variety of ways, ranging from the need for "limited options" in attacks on the Soviet Union to the need for partially replacing the role of theater nuclear forces in the event of their neutralization or destruction.

Limited strategic options would provide for selective force applications by a small number of strategic weapons against carefully selected key targets. Their purpose would be to provide alternatives "to mutual destruction or surrender"; their design would be directed toward war termination rather than the achievement of military or political gain.

In the case where theater nuclear forces, particularly tactical air, are neutralized, strategic weapons might be used against fixed targets in satellite countries or even against forward-deployed Soviet troops in combat near the Demarcation Line under specialized conditions. In either of these roles they present new complications to the Soviet decision-makers. Exploratory studies have indicated that both strategic and theater nuclear forces might be effectively used on many of these kinds of targets.

2. Theater Nuclear Forces

In the case of theater forces (defining these to include French and British long-range nuclear forces, as well as U.S. theater nuclear forces) the relationships can become somewhat complicated. The British and French nuclear forces acting independently or in concert could attack a variety of targets other than the major Soviet urban/industrial centers normally considered their primary targets. The fact that the British and French long-range nuclear forces can be used independently of U.S. decisions also means that a form of coupling might be imposed on the United States without formal agreement. The unpredictability of such a situation could act as a deterrent element by injecting additional uncertainties into the Soviets' estimate of the potential U.S./NATO response.

The existence of meaningful nuclear capabilities in European hands would help to offset the loss of West European confidence if a perception of decoupling were to prevail in European capitals. It would strengthen West European resistance against Soviet coercion, particularly if their nuclear forces were to be fashioned gradually and with U.S. support. Such a European capability would have to be based on French and British nuclear forces. Eventually these forces would need to be coordinated in a wider European framework, if possible in NATO but otherwise in some other European structure, in order to demonstrate allied cohesion and resolve vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. While there would have to be some arrangement for joint targeting, neither France

nor Britain would have to surrender ultimate national control over their forces or jettison their own national targeting plans.

The existing QRA aircraft currently provide an essential coupling between European/NATO forces and U.S. strategic forces. If in the future, for political, economic, or military reasons (i.e., the high cost and vulnerability to enemy attack), the QRA aircraft are removed or reduced in number, their role must be filled by other U.S. systems.

3. Tactical Nuclear Forces

At the tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) level, coupling should be achieved through integrated deployment with the conventional forces. The use or threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons against massed ground forces may deter, disperse or destroy them. The doctrine and design of tactical nuclear weapons must be carefully planned for selective control, minimum collateral damage, and minimum probability of further escalation. They must also take full account of the deterrent advantages associated with the uncertainties of first use.

Tactical nuclear weapons have the potential of enhancing deterrence and of redressing the imbalance between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, to realize this potential a number of technical, operational and doctrinal improvements should be implemented. It is understood that the required technology "is now largely in hand" and that if a decision were "made to move to a new generation of 'cleaner' tactical weapons it would probably take about three years from the time of decision to deployment."¹

4. Conventional Forces

Although tactical nuclear forces can augment and assist conventional forces, they cannot replace them. Sufficient numbers of U.S.

¹ William Beecher, "Over the Threshold," Army, Vol. 22, No. 7, pp. 17, 20 (July 1972).

conventional forces are essential to provide a visible, credible coupling between potential military actions in the European theater and the U.S. strategic umbrella. This is of particular importance because of the political significance West Europeans attach to the U.S. presence.

Sufficient NATO/U.S. conventional forces are required to force the Soviets to assemble large forces prior to their attack so that their intentions can be discerned in advance and so that the Soviets will recognize that any large attack will exact a significant price and will not be successful over a short period of time. Considerable numbers of conventional forces are also required to (1) deal with "nuclear-scared" deployed forces and with incursions too small to warrant the activation of nuclear defenses, and (2) to participate in the nuclear defense, should the latter become necessary.

C. Doctrinal, Organizational and Materiel Concepts

Expected technological improvements over the next decade in weapons and equipment (e.g., firepower; intelligence and target acquisition; communications, command and control; strategic and tactical mobility and logistics) when coupled with related changes in doctrinal, organizational and materiel concepts, hold considerable promise for significantly improving NATO's defense posture. In order to take full advantage of anticipated technological improvements, it will be important to correlate such advances with the specific requirements of the European theater and its political, economic and manpower constraints. If the force postures and force objectives outlined above are to be realized, a number of improvements need to be accomplished in both conventional and nuclear weapons systems (to include dual-capable multimiission systems). Among the areas requiring priority effort are:

- Weapon accuracy;
- Target acquisition;
- Tailored weapon effects and capabilities for both conventional and nuclear weapons;
- System reliability and force flexibility;
- Command-control and communication systems.

D. Manpower Considerations

1. Citizen Army Concept for Western Europe¹

If the crucial problem of manpower is to be solved, some means must be found for augmenting the limited number of active forces which most of the NATO countries are prepared to maintain during peacetime. The economic, social, and moral aspects bearing on the maintenance of standing armies as an element of military power in the democracies of the future press toward the evolution of a situation where the citizen soldier will provide a major segment of defensive strength. In recognition of this reality, European military thought is turning to variations of the citizen army concept as a major element in preserving national security in the future.

Various versions of this concept might be considered for the integration of reserve, militia and territorial units of the overall armed forces of any given country. One such concept for Western Europe might provide for indigenous ground forces consisting of active forces, ready reserves and territorial units. Under this concept:

- The full-time active duty professional units would possess advanced weaponry and equipment and would be highly mobile, high-firepower units with strong antiarmor capability.
- A reserve consisting of combat and logistical units which would be organized and equipped similar to the active units and be ready for the early support or replacement of the active units.
- Ready territorial units consisting of combat elements and paramilitary forces which are rapidly mobilizable on a regional or local basis.
 - The combat elements could be organized as light infantry, light artillery and combat engineer battalions, equipped with a quantity of low cost weapons that include light weight antitank missiles as well as antipersonnel and antiair weaponry.

¹ A more extensive discussion is contained in: J. L. Lellenberg, "Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept," SSC-TN-8974-82, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (October 1972).

- The numerous small units of paramilitary, unconventional forces, with a variety of irregular "partisan" capabilities could provide "stay behind" battlefield surveillance and target acquisition for the high-firepower, regular forces.
- The "part-time" and "irregular" units should not be considered as substituting for highly mobile, high-firepower, full-time active forces, but, properly organized and integrated into the national structure, reserve units such as these could provide a substantial part of the manpower required for both a combat arm and for logistical support services.

An outstanding and manifest characteristic of such a ground force posture would be its almost totally defensive nature. In a political as well as military sense this obvious characteristic would negate the Soviet contention that is now being used to justify the stationing of numerous Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe to protect against "possible attack" by NATO forces.¹ It would also make evident the fact that one of the principal missions of these Soviet troops is to enforce Soviet hegemony over the satellites.

The introduction of citizen armies, with their ubiquity, lower operating costs and far smaller demands on the productive time of the individuals involved, might improve the citizens' and hence the nation's attitude towards contributing more to the defense of their own homelands. Such units would complement but not be a substitute for highly mobile, high-firepower, full-time active units.

If any such concept were adopted, each NATO nation should formulate such a defense policy for itself, because only that nation can judge whether or not such a concept is militarily, politically, and sociologically feasible in its own environment.

2. U.S. Forces

With respect to the U.S. Armed Forces, there are a number of profound and unanswered questions remaining regarding the desirability

¹ See Gen. Col. A. S. Zheltov, et al., Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, Second Edition (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1969). See also Col. M. P. Skirido, The People, the Army and the General (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1970).

and feasibility of an all-volunteer force over the long term. Until such time as the draftees now in service are released and until all enlistments are purely voluntary rather than draft encouraged, it will not be known whether a volunteer program will be capable of providing, on a continuing basis, professional military forces of the size needed for the present and foreseeable future. There is the equally important and more difficult question as to whether the needed number of reservists can be recruited and maintained in the absence of a draft environment.

In view of the critical importance of having adequate numbers of well-trained and ready reserves as early reinforcements for employment shortly after M-Day, it is important that the Army give high priority attention to this matter in connection with its current study of the Guard and Reserve forces.

E. Specific Considerations Applying to U.S. Army Force Postures

In view of the various political, economic, technological and domestic factors involved it should be anticipated that NATO's force structure will undergo significant changes.

As previously indicated it will continue to be important for sufficient numbers of U.S. conventional forces to be stationed in Europe to provide for a visible and credible coupling between potential military activities in Europe and the U.S. strategic deterrent. It also appears important to place added emphasis on providing for the earlier readiness and faster deployment of U.S./CONUS reserves (both active and inactive reserve components) to Europe.

Active forces should retain the general flexible posture which applies today, and strategic reserve units in CONUS should be capable of operations in Europe or Asia.

Reserve component units might well be theater-oriented as their primary mission (in equipment, training and organization) and assigned to specific commands within an overseas theater. Equipment for both reserve and active units should be adaptable to Pacific or European operations insofar as possible. As a practical matter there may also

be a need to develop specific area-oriented materiel with possible modular change for other areas. Similarly, materiel developments over the next decade may necessarily be oriented toward a less-than-optimum design in order to meet cost constraints. Given that military assistance will continue over the next decade, some of this equipment may be specifically designed for indigenous Allied forces.

VIII CONCLUSIONS

A. Negotiations and Europe's Security

In the United States, the Congress has already turned down funds for improving the accuracy of MIRVs--a unilateral U.S. action that throws away bargaining power with the Soviet Union in the various East-West negotiating areas--SALT II, CSCE, MBFR, and others. The West needs time to reach an agreement on the concept of force relationships that will illuminate the true value of each force element in the chain of deterrence and defense. Which forces are stabilizing, which destabilizing? Since the aim of all the arms control and limitation negotiations is the improvement of mutual security for all--the United States, the USSR, and Eastern as well as Western Europe--all have a stake in enhancing strategic stability and in reducing the importance of military force in East-West relations. Certainly these are the American aims.

The force posture advanced in this study for NATO is designed to reach a condition of mutual security based on strategic stability. Such a posture would permit and encourage East-West political, economic, technical, and cultural interactions and exchanges, without reviving Soviet fears of future aggression based on large-scale NATO capability for offensive air-ground operations. The posture is designed to deny such a capability to the Soviets without seeking to attain one for NATO. It reinforces the legitimacy of the American presence and security interests in Europe. America's military power remains coupled to the defense of Europe because America's security and survival as a free and independent state is inextricably linked to the security of Western Europe.

B. Recommendations

The concept advanced in this study is based on denying the Soviets any offensive political utility to their force over and above their

legitimate (defensive) security needs. If this NATO concept is to be realized in the 1980s, the United States should:

- Enhance extended deterrence through policies and military capabilities that will increase political credibility of the U.S. strategic force coupling to NATO European theater forces.
- Provide strategic force response options for war and/or crisis termination other than assured destruction.
- Maintain the compatibility of the U.S. strategic forces and strategic doctrine with those of allied nuclear powers.
- Develop and implement a political-military concept acceptable to the allies that is based on the continuity of force relationships.
- Before war occurs, develop force application concepts and political-military doctrines for:
 - Crisis control and termination;
 - Limited strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear response options for war termination short of general nuclear war;
 - War and crisis bargaining and negotiations to terminate, based on mutually acceptable terms.

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13. ABSTRACT

This Theater Force Posture Analysis Executive Summary, the Summary (Volume I) and the supporting appendices (Volume II) apply primarily to the Central Region of the Allied Command Europe. U.S. objectives and U.S. policy for Europe in the changing international environment of the 1970s are examined as are the foreign policy and national objectives of the Soviet Union. European views of NATO defense problems are then presented with particular emphasis on the linkage between U.S. strategic and NATO forces. The implications of future negotiations (CSCE, MBFR, etc.) on the theater forces are discussed with the pitfalls and problem areas highlighted. Guidelines are then delineated for NATO Theater Forces for 1972-1982 and a NATO force posture and force characteristics are proposed. Volume I and the appendices in Volume I and Volume II provide detailed support for the summary material presented in this Executive Summary.

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